CGTN: China’s dynamic zero-COVID policy sets the foundation for reopening

BEIJING, Jan. 4, 2023 /PRNewswire/ — China has adjusted its response to COVID-19 prevention and control in recent weeks. It announced it will downgrade COVID-19 management from Class A to Class B infectious disease while resuming passport, visa issuance and easing border-entry policies starting on January 8, 2023. It also changed the Chinese name of the disease from “novel coronavirus pneumonia” to “novel coronavirus infection.”

China’s decision has drawn widespread criticisms from a section of the Western media outlets, and also the Western political and intellectual circles, same as the previous “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. Criticism ranges from comparing China’s latest COVID-19 surge to a “catastrophe” that could “put the global economy at risk” to scaremongering over the rise of “new coronavirus mutants.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said that “Currently, we are adapting our COVID-19 response measures to the new developments in the epidemic, so as to better coordinate epidemic response and socioeconomic development. We believe that, with the Chinese people’s joint efforts and solidarity, we will usher in a new phase of steady and orderly economic and social development.”

China’s dynamic zero-COVID policy protected people’s lives and bought time for understanding the virus based on science, for research and development of vaccines, anti-viral drugs and therapeutics, and for vaccinating more people nationwide.

According to the latest official data, China has administered over 3.4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines nationwide with over 90 percent of its 1.4 billion population fully vaccinated. Over 87 percent of people over the age of 60 fully vaccinated. Meanwhile, China has rolled out the second booster shot with 13 types of COVID-19 vaccines approved for the purpose.

The figures speak for themselves. To this day, China has the lowest COVID-19 death toll among major countries in the world. In contrast, the U.S., with a quarter of China’s population, has reported over a million deaths. The past three years laid the foundation for China’s policy adjustments.

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-12-30/China-s-dynamic-zero-COVID-policy-sets-the-foundation-for-reopening-1gbxNZWCc5a/index.html

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CGTN: China’s economic outlook after the COVID-19 policy shift

BEIJING, Jan. 4, 2023 /PRNewswire/ — China’s recent announcement of changing its COVID-19 policies has drawn attention to its potentially negative economic impact.

True, China may face some challenges in its retail sales and consumer spending in the early days when the country downgraded its level of COVID-19 management. The lifting of COVID-19 related restrictions doesn’t mean an immediate rebound in economic growth. An increase of infection cases that could happen in any country – not just China – means that it takes time for people to get before they can go back to shops and restaurants.

But, latest figures have already shown the revival of China’s consumption market. Since the shift in COVID-19 policy, the attendance at some movie theaters in Beijing has returned to 75 percent of the regular level and popular diners have posted more than 80 percent of customer traffic, China’s Xinhua News Agency reported.

The optimization of COVID-19 response means Chinese residents will be more willing to travel and spend. Consumption will become a major driving force for economic growth, chief economist with China Securities Huang Wentao said in a recent interview with Xinhua. Wu Chaoming, chief economist with Chasing International Economic Institute, believes that the per capita consumption expenditure of Chinese residents would increase from 8 percent to 12 percent in the new year.

Many foreign firms are also upbeat about China’s economic outlook. “Although it (China’s downgrade of COVID-19 management) might bring some challenges in the short term, we believe we will see a meaningful recovery in the long run,” said Kenichi Tanaka, president of Fujifilm (China) Investment Co., Ltd, as Xinhua reported.

Admittedly, the arduous anti-virus battle over the past three years has caused some disruptions. But the Chinese economy has managed to consolidate its resilience. According to the General Administration of Customs, China’s foreign trade of goods expanded 8.6 percent year-on-year to 38.34 trillion yuan (5.78 trillion U.S. dollars) in the first 11 months of 2022.

Against the backdrop of the global virus-induced economic trough, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent from the third quarter of 2019 to the third quarter of 2022, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This is well above the world average. The figure of the United States – the world’s largest economy – stood at 1.6 percent during the same period. Major developed countries including Germany, France, Britain, and Japan saw their GDP expanding at below 0.5 percent.

China has also kept a relatively low inflation level at 2 percent, according to the People’s bank of China. The United States, however, has seen inflation reaching 9.1 percent in June, 2022, the highest rate in more than 40 years. According to the Moody’s Analytics 2022 data, soaring inflation caused ordinary American families to fork out $445 more per month compared to a year ago. While the skyrocketing costs of food, energy, and shelter put extra pressure on millions of American households already struggling with their family budget, China is seeing a decline in food prices – a 0.8 percent drop month-on-month in November, data from the National Bureau of Statistics showed.

Fact speaks louder than words. China’s economy remains resilient and strong.

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-01-01/Is-China-s-economy-outlook-grim-after-COVID-19-policy-shift-No–1gezTG6B7zO/index.html

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Recognizing and tackling a global food crisis

This year, acute food insecurity is projected to reach a new peak, surpassing the food crisis experienced in 2007-2008. A combination of factors—including greater poverty and supply chain disruptions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, rising inflation, and high commodity prices—has increased food and nutrition insecurity. This is a multifaceted crisis, affecting access to and availability of food, with long-term consequences for health and productivity. The World Bank has scaled up its efforts to bolster food security, reduce risks, and strengthen food systems over the short and long term. Urgent action is needed across governments and multilateral partners to avert a severe and prolonged food crisis.

Declining food access and availability, with high risks

For most countries, domestic food prices have risen sharply in 2022, compromising access to food—particularly for low-income households, who spend the majority of their incomes on food and are especially vulnerable to food price increases. Higher food inflation followed a sharp spike in global food commodity prices, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Average global wheat, maize, and rice prices were respectively 18 percent, 27 percent, and 10 percent higher in October 2022 relative to October 2021.

At the same time, food availability is declining. For the first time in a decade, global cereal production will fall in 2022 relative to 2021. More countries are relying on existing food stocks and reserves to fill the gap, raising the risk if the current crisis persists. And rising energy and fertilizer prices—key inputs to produce food—threaten production for the next season, especially in net fertilizer-importing countries and regions like East Africa.

These trends are already affecting health. Stunting and wasting in children, and anaemia in pregnant women, are increasing as households are less able to include sufficient nutrition in their diets. A recent World Bank survey indicated that 42 percent of households across all countries covered were unable to eat healthy or nutritious food in the previous 30 days. These health effects carry long-term consequences for the ability to learn and work, and therefore escape poverty.

Globally, food security is under threat beyond just the immediate crisis. Growing public debt burdens, currency depreciation, higher inflation, increasing interest rates, and the rising risk of a global recession may compound access to and availability of food, especially for importing countries. At the same time, the agricultural food sector is both vulnerable and a contributor to climate change, responsible for one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions. And agricultural productivity growth is not staying ahead of the impacts of climate change, contributing to more food-related shocks. For example, an unprecedented multi-season drought has worsened food insecurity in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia on the verge of famine.

Managing the crisis and preparing for the future

The World Bank is responding to this escalating crisis with four areas of actions: (i) supporting production and producers, (ii) facilitating increased trade in food and production inputs, (iii) supporting vulnerable households, and (iv) investing in sustainable food security. It has made over $26 billion available for short- and long-term food security interventions in 69 countries, including active interventions in 22 of the 24 hunger hotspots identified as countries with the most pressing needs by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme. Since April 2022, the World Bank has disbursed $8.1 billion, approximately evenly split between crisis response and long-term resilience projects. In the short term, projects like the Emergency Project to Combat the Food Crisis in Cameroon will provide 98,490 beneficiaries with emergency food and nutrition assistance with support from the World Food Programme. In addition to supporting vulnerable households, governments of food-exporting countries can improve global food security by limiting measures like export bans and stockpiling of food. In the longer term, governments can make an enormous difference by repurposing public spending on agricultural policies and support for a more resilient and sustainable food system that directly improves health, economies, and the planet.

These actions and newly released funding underline the scale of the crisis. Timely, coordinated, and sustained action through partnerships such as the Global Alliance on Food Security can maximize the impact of new policies and funding, and mitigate the scale of the crisis. The time to act is now.

Source: World Bank

UN chief appoints new commander of peacekeeping force in DR Congo

UNITED NATIONS, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Wednesday appointed Lieutenant General Otávio Rodrigues De Miranda Filho of Brazil as the new force commander of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

Miranda Filho succeeds Lieutenant General Marcos de Sá Affonso da Costa of Brazil, who will complete his assignment on Feb 28, and is expected to take over in March, said a statement issued by Guterres’ press office.

Miranda Filho has several years of experience in command-and-control structures in the Brazilian Army, and has held other positions including head of international affairs in the Brazilian Defense Forces, the statement said.

He also has international experience, having served as military attaché of the Brazilian Embassy in China from 2014 to 2016, according to the statement.

Source: NAM NEWS NETWORK

The nitty gritty of climate policy: Taking stock of COP27, looking ahead to COP28

The 27th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held this past November in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm El-Sheikh, took place amid a tense global economy and geopolitical outlook. The “polycrisis” of high prices for food, energy, and debt have strained the budgets of all countries, but especially developing countries already under pressure from costs associated with the global pandemic. Indeed, two-thirds of developing and middle-income countries are now in or at risk of default, as Global North central banks raise interest rates to tame inflation and the war in Ukraine further destabilizes global food and oil markets.

Thus, finance was at the top of the agenda for last year’s COP; specifically, finance for loss and damage (L&D). The agreement to establish a fund for loss and damage was a historic win for the Group of 77 (G77) developing countries, but progress on mitigation stalled, leaving 1.5 alive but on life support. This article explores those issues and more, with some thoughts on the road ahead for COP28 in Dubai.

Lots on Loss and Damage, Less on Mitigation

Developing countries have been requesting L&D support within the UNFCCC for years, making the agreement on new funding arrangements for loss and damage a major achievement for the Group of 77. Developed countries have recognized the need for L&D support, including in Article 8 of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and COP27 saw the operationalization of the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD), a technical assistance body inside the Warsaw International Mechanism.

But the major headline was the decision to establish a new, dedicated fund within the UNFCCC. This includes a Transitional Committee (TC) of 24 developed and developing countries, which will have its first meeting by March 2023 to work out the new fund’s modalities and sources of revenue. Per the agreement, the TC will present its plan for adoption and operationalization at COP28 in Dubai.

Another important part of the outcome on L&D in Sharm el-Sheikh has not been widely covered. Paragraph 11 of the decision text invites the UN secretary-general to convene the principles of international financial institutions (IFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs), to identify how they can respond to countries’ L&D needs. To put this in context: even the UNFCCC climate funds don’t formally allocate money to loss and damage. Paragraph 12 then invites the IMF and World Bank to consider at their 2023 spring meeting the potential for IFIs to contribute to L&D funding arrangements, “including new and innovative arrangements.” This is why the Transition Committee for the L&D fund is set to meet by March: so that their work can inform that of the IMF and World Bank at their meetings in April. In short, the L&D decision at COP27 has created a bridge to link the global politics of climate change, decided by parties at the COPs, with the money for climate change, allocated by the major shareholders of IFIs and MDBs. Thus, the agreement is a breakthrough not only for loss and damage, but quite possibly for global economic multilateralism.

The attention and political capital spent on loss and damage meant that other important issues were overlooked or compromised. Mitigation was one of those issues. The push in years before, including in Glasgow at COP26 to keep 1.5C alive seems to have lost momentum, as calls from around 80 countries, developed and developing, to include in the text language phasing out all fossil fuels (not just coal) was ignored, replaced instead by language on renewable energy. While the text on renewables is positive, it is not nearly enough to limit warming below 1.5C. Governments did agree on a Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) text but it was not ambitious, and some developing country parties described it as “just another talk-shop.” While the goal of the MWP was to “urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation,” most countries failed to increase their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Finance

While the focus remained on loss and damage for the most part, traditional climate finance was still a major point of discussion and contention. The $100 billion per year in climate finance collectively promised at COP15 by the Annex II countries has not been fulfilled, and the negotiation rooms were rife with disagreement about which countries should be contributing. Developed nations tried and failed to include certain developing countries that are major emitters and possess potential to contribute. There was a focus on what the new goal post-2025 would look like, and progress remains to be seen next year in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with eight technical expert dialogues remaining over the next two years. There was criticism of the workings of the GCF as well, with calls to simplify the accreditation process and disbursement of funds, as well as ensure greater longer-term guarantees of such funding.

Finally, what constitutes “climate finance” remains elusive. One of the developing nations voiced concern that climate finance still constitutes loans, which push them further into debt. Another supported the response by suggesting that if loans are considered climate finance, then the repayment of these loans should equally be considered climate finance.

There was a great deal of discussion involving calls to include private-sector finance and the failures of developed countries to enable this funding. To that effect, several events in the pavilions outside the negotiation rooms made progress. Established at COP26, Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero announced at COP27 that it would work with Bloomberg Philanthropies to support a coal phaseout with UN Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance Mark Carney serving as a special advisor. Furthermore, the African COP delivered the Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI). An ambitious initiative, it aims to produce 300 million carbon credits annually by 2030 while unlocking $6 billion in revenue by 2030 and supporting 30 million jobs.

Egypt delivered strong outcomes on climate finance, but in a grander scheme, these outcomes are moving at a glacial pace. Nations need quicker, fit-for-purpose financing that address their climate financing needs without adding additional burden to their fiscal space.

Global Goal on Adaptation

COP27 was an African COP, and adaptation is a key priority for Africa. However, the Glasgow Sharm el-Sheikh (GlaSS) Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) will not conclude until COP28 in the UAE, so there was no clear mandate for a decision on the GGA at this COP. This made the GGA negotiations a bit muddled right from the beginning, as negotiators did not have a clear idea of what the end point of this COP might be on the GGA. Early on, the G77 put forward a proposal for a framework on the GGA, for use both in the next four GlaSS workshops, and on the GGA overall. This framework then became the subject of most of the debate within GGA negotiations, and in the end produced a decision text that still did not offer much clarity on what the next four workshops will cover or how the GGA will be implemented and assessed overall. The lack of progress made in GGA at COP27 was a lost opportunity and increases pressure on COP28 to produce impactful results.

Four more workshops will take place in 2023, with themes still to be announced. The GlaSS will then conclude at COP28 in UAE, with the adoption of the framework that was initiated at this COP. Because of the very broad nature of the COP27 GGA decision text, there is much work left to be done at these four workshops if the GlaSS hopes to conclude with the adoption of a truly substantive and useful framework on the GGA.

Gender and Youth

After the first negotiations in the early days of COP27, it became clear that the main topic in all rooms would be finance and funding, including in the negotiation room on gender and climate. One objective was to review the gender action plan (GAP) on climate change that is part of the Lima Work Programme on Gender, established in 2014, which aims to advance and integrate gender considerations for implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement. An area of challenge is the lack of funding needed to implement the GAP. COP27 gave developing countries the opportunity to ask developed countries to fund it, and though an agreement was reached, not all parties were happy, with some arguing that the outcome was not as strong as it should be. Many negotiators also expressed concern about the lack of transparency and process of this negotiation and how the text was agreed upon.

Youth engage in the formal process through Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE). Under ACE’s action plan, governments agreed to short-term activities in four priority areas, including area C, which calls for “meaningfully including youth in and engaging with them on climate action at all levels and facilitating the inclusive participation of, inter alia, children, women, indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities, in climate action, according to national circumstances,” for which governments and relevant organizations are responsible. For many young people who were part of the negotiation, this was a major achievement, and was also notable for being one of the first negotiating texts agreed upon at the first week of COP27, before governments reached agreement on other issues such as mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.

The Road Ahead

For the first time since it was agreed upon in the Paris Agreement, there will be a global stocktake (GST) during COP28, a process (to happen every five years) which aims to evaluate progress on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The first technical dialogues took place at COP27, where discussions focused on how governments and non-state actors can address the gaps in climate action. While discussions—which include not only governments but also a diverse range of participants from a variety of sectors—were rich, it remains unclear what the outcome will be for the GST. The third and final technical dialogue is expected to be held in Bonn, Germany, with a political discussion to take place at COP28 in 2023.

Parties will face a heavy workload in 2023, and several questions remain unanswered. These include how to design the L&D fund so that it can provide adequate and predictable support to affected countries in time for COP28; how to bring back to the center the call to limit emissions to 1.5C and to hold governments and the private sector accountable for their commitments; and how to agree on a Global Goal on Adaptation that is inclusive of both developed and developing country priorities.

While the decision on L&D was a breakthrough, the details the TC will have to discuss will determine whether or not the fund is a transformational platform for climate finance or just another fund. It remains to be seen how open the parties to COP are to link their work with the major IFIs and to use this opportunity to connect the need for climate finance with the wider financial flows, mechanisms, and innovative sources. Per the decision text, the TC will make recommendations on institutional arrangements, funding sources, and other questions by COP28, where the parties are expected to adopt an agreement operationalizing the new fund.

While L&D will remain front and center for COP28, other aspects on adaptation will have to be more in the political agenda, including the GGA. The GGA has the potential to provide a new vision on adaptation, one that builds resilience, empowers communities, and recognizes the transboundary nature of adaptation.

Finally, action on L&D cannot and should not be a trade-off for mitigation. Limiting 1.5C is a moral imperative and is at the core of the survival of many countries. The call to end fossil fuel production and expansion should remain high in the UAE, home to 10 percent of the total world supply of oil reserves and the world’s fifth-largest natural gas reserves. The UAE president of COP28 will no doubt be under pressure from governments and activists to demonstrate its commitment to transitioning its own economy away from fossil fuels.

Source: International Peace Institute